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Abstract: In September 1997, President Jiang Zemin stated that the multi-polarity trend contributed 
towards worldwide peace, stability and prosperity, while both hegemonism and the policy of Power were 
still a major threat to peace and international stability. A few years later, the new Russia of Vladimir Putin 
promoted a multi-polar system of international relations, claiming that the global order of the XXI century 
had to be based on mechanisms for the collective resolution of key problems. The Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation, founded in 2001, pursued the so-called struggle against the “three evils”, that is terrorism, 
separatism and extremism. Besides, the organisation managed to combine China, a massive world energy 
consumer, with high profile energy producers like Kazakhstan and an unmatched hydropower producer 
such as Tajikistan. On the other hand, Russia at the end of the second Putin mandate needed to make 
common cause with other Powers in order to exercise a serious influence in international affairs. Within 
such a scenario, the United States National Security Strategy of 2006 claimed that it was necessary to work 
closely with Russia on strategic issues of common interest. The Bush Administration also encouraged 
Beijing to continue down the road of reform and openness towards liberty, stability, and prosperity. Despite 
this, Chinese leaders were being accused of acting as if they could somehow “lock up” energy supplies 
around the world or seek to direct markets rather than opening them up. 
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Introduction 
In his work, “The Grand Chessboard”, former National Security Adviser Zbigniew 
Brzezinski highlighted the importance of Eurasia, writing at the end of the twentieth 
century that a power dominating that area would control two of the world’s three most 
advanced and economically productive regions, almost automatically entailing Africa’s 
subordination, rendering the Western Hemisphere and Oceania geopolitically peripheral.1 
Brzezinski was writing a few years after the end of the Cold War, when it seemed the 
United States would lead the world along a path of market democracy. Such a supremacy, 
according to Samuel P. Huntington, had determined a situation in which a quick end to 
the status quo would produce massive international instability: «The sustained 
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1 See Z. BRZEZINSKI, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, New 
York, NY, Basic Books, 1997, p. 31. 
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international primacy of the United States is central to the welfare and security of 
Americans and to the future of freedom, democracy, open economies, and international 
order in the world».2 In the same years, the Pentagon’s draft Defense Planning Guidance 
for the Fiscal Years 1994-99 affirmed: «Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence 
of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere […]».3  
     To be honest, there were many factors why Central Asia was of paramount importance, 
such as the availability of rich energy resources, its geopolitical location among regional 
powers like India, China, Russia, and Iran, as well as the proximity to Afghanistan.4 
Moreover, China’s conception of Eurasia was based on a series of interconnected lines of 
thought, aiming at: a) resolving territorial problems; b) preventing any threat to the control 
over the province of Xinjiang; c) gaining the best possible economic benefit in the post-
Soviet space.5 As a matter of fact, the Chinese preference for multi-polarity was due to 
the neo-realistic thought that the power of a State could only be positively checked and 
balanced by that of other nations, thus better serving the interests of weaker and less 
privileged countries. Such a stance had already been adopted in the 1980s, both as a 
consequence of changing great-power relations, and because of China’s path to 
modernisation. However, while in the early 1990s a lot of Chinese scholars thought that 
the US-led unipolar moment would be of short duration, at the end of the decade they 
tended to believe it would take quite a long time for a multi-polar structure to emerge.6 
To back this concept, in his report to the 15th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party 
in September 1997, President Jiang Zemin reaffirmed the idea of a changing world. 
According to the Chinese President, the multi-polarity trend contributed towards 
                                                          
2 S.P. HUNTINGTON, Why International Primacy Matters, in «International Security», XVII, 4, Spring 1993, 
p. 83. 
3 See Excerpts from Pentagon’s Plan: Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival, in «New York Times», 
March 8, 1992, p. 14. 
4  See M. RAKHIMOV, The Institutional and Political Transformation of the SCO in the Context of 
Geopolitical Changes in Central Asia, in M. FREDHOLM, ed., The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and 
Eurasian Geopolitics: New Directions, Perspectives, and Challenges, Copenhagen, Nias Press, 2013, p. 
63. 
5 See P. STODBAN, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and Asian Multilateralism in the Twenty-first 
Century: A Critical Assessment, in N.S. SISODIA - V. KRISHNAPPA, eds., Global Power Shifts and Strategic 
Transition in Asia, New Delhi, Academic Foundation, 2009, p. 220. 
6 See X. XIN, The Chinese Concept of “Twenty Years’ Strategic Opportunities” and its Implications for 
Asian Security Order, ibid., pp. 62-63.  
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worldwide peace, stability and prosperity. Despite these positive signs, the statesman 
pointed out that both hegemonism and the policy of Power were still a major threat to 
peace and international stability. In order to claim the legitimacy of China’s social system, 
Jiang Zemin added that all countries were entitled to choose the social system, 
development strategies and lifestyle suiting their own conditions.7  
     As regarded the American stance on Central Asia, the Deputy Secretary of State, 
Strobe Talbott, in a major 1997 speech had stated that «The consolidation of free societies 
[…] from the Black Sea to the Pamir Mountains, will open up a valuable trade and 
transport corridor […] between Europe and Asia. […] If economic and political reform 
[…] does not succeed, […] the region could become a breeding ground for terrorism […] 
Our support has four dimensions: the promotion of democracy, the creation of free market 
economies, the sponsorship of peace and cooperation within and among the countries of 
the region, and their integration with the larger international community».8 In particular, 
in the Caspian region the United States had five objectives, that is: a) energy security and 
diversification; b) rapid development of the region’s energy resources and trade linkages 
as pivotal to the independence, the prosperity, the democracy and stability of all the 
countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus; c) U.S. energy companies’ investments; d) 
concern about proposals forcing more oil to the Strait of Hormuz; e) viable and reliable 
alternatives for export of the region’s resources along an East-West corridor.9   
     Meanwhile, the Chinese government was pursuing a new geopolitical approach, called 
“New Security Concept” (“Xin anquan guandian”), according to which security was no 
longer restricted to only military aspects. In a nutshell, China’s perception of its security 
environment included six strands: 1) no major war; 2) globalisation; 3) the U.S. as a 
partner and competitor; 4) non‐traditional security challenges; 5) energy insecurity; 6) 
                                                          
7 See J. ZEMIN, Report Delivered at the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on 
September 12, 1997: Hold High the Great Banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory for an All-Round Advancement 
of the Cause of Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics into the 21st Century, September 12, 1997, 
in http://www.bjreview.com/document/txt/2011-03/25/content_363499.htm [accessed on May 1, 2019].  
8  S. TALBOTT, Address at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Baltimore, 
Maryland: A Farewell to Flashman: American Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia, July 21, 1997, in 
https://1997-2001.state.gov/regions/nis/970721talbott.html [accessed on May 9, 2019]. 
9 See F. PENA, The U.S. Role in the Caucasus and Central Asia: Hearing before the House Committee on 
International Relations, 105th Congress, April 30, 1998, in http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/ 
intlrel/hfa50308.000/hfa50308_0f.htm [accessed on May 9, 2019]. 
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China’s rise.10 The expression “New Security Concept” appeared in the Chinese Defence 
White Paper, China’s Defence, published in 1998. According to such a document, 
security should be based on mutual trust and common interests, cooperation, respect for 
each other’s sovereignty. In international relations, the role of economic factors was 
becoming more outstanding. Hence, the Chinese definition of economic security included 
steady economic growth based on free and fair access to overseas market and 
uninterrupted supply of natural resources. The Defence paper also incorporated into 
military security non-traditional issues like terrorism and drug trafficking, as well as 
extremism and separatism.11 On grounds of that, the rise of China pushed Moscow to 
reorient its foreign policy. Engagement with Beijing became necessary to reach a 
settlement to any possible disputes. After Boris Yeltsin had said in April 1997 that Russia 
wanted the world to be multi-polar, three years later Putin put an end to pro-West 
orientations, thus marking a shift towards Russia as a Eurasian power.12 In the same 
period, in December 1997, the Russians had issued the so called National Security 
Blueprint, which stressed the expansion of Russian interests in problems of international 
security, specifying that the only prospect of NATO expansion to the East was 
unacceptable to Russia; therefore, Yeltsin claimed the implementation of an active 
foreign policy course aimed at consolidating Russia’s position as one of the most 
influential centres of the developing multi-polar world through equal partnership with the 
other great Powers.13 By virtue of this, the new Russia of Vladimir Putin stressed the 
topmost foreign policy priority in the protection of the interests of the individual, society, 
and the State. Within this framework, the Foreign Policy Conception of the Russian 
federation, approved by the President on June 28, 2000, directed the main efforts towards 
the following aims: a) ensuring the reliable security of the country, preserve and 
                                                          
10 See A. KUMAR, New Security Concept of China: An Analysis, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 
IPCS Special Report 125, May 2012, New Delhi, in https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2584/ 
8436de67b462ee2a8074cd0ab696c555bd04.pdf [accessed on May 2, 2019]. 
11See China’s National Defense 1998, in https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/China%E2% 
80%99s-National-Defense-in-1998.pdf?x87069 [accessed on May 2, 2019]. 
12 See STODBAN, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and Asian Multilateralism, cit., p. 222.  
13 See Russian National Security Blueprint, in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, December 26, 1997, pp. 4-5\FBIS-SOV-
97-364, December 30, 1997, in https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/blueprint.html [accessed on April 
30, 2019]. 
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strengthen its sovereignty, its territorial integrity, and its strong and respected position in 
the world community; b) influencing global processes with the objective of forming a 
stable, just, and democratic world order based on the generally recognised norms of 
international law; c) creating the external conditions favourable to the steady development 
of Russia; d) forming a belt of good-neighbourliness along the perimeter of Russia’s 
borders.14  
     As concerned the relations with NATO, the document acknowledged the importance of 
cooperation in the interests of maintaining security and stability in Europe, provided the 
Atlantic Alliance followed the principles stated in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act.15 
However, on a certain number of parameters, NATO’s political and military guidelines did 
not coincide with security interests of Moscow, since the provisions of NATO’s new 
strategic concept did not rule out operations employing force beyond the zone of the 
application of the Washington Treaty and without the sanction of the UN Security 
Council. As an evidence of that, in the second paragraph there is a clear reference to new 
threats to the national interests of Russia, such as a growing trend towards the 
establishment of a unipolar world order, with domination by the United States. On the 
contrary, Russia promoted a multi-polar system of international relations, claiming that 
the global order of the XXI century had to be based on mechanisms for the collective 
resolution of key problems, such as military-political rivalry among regional powers, the 
growth of separatism, ethnic-national and religious extremism, as well international 
terrorism, transnational organised crime, and illegal trafficking in drugs and weapons. 
Therefore, emphasis was to be placed on invigoration of Russia’s participation in the main 
integrative structures of the Asia-Pacific Region.16  The question of sovereignty had 
already been dealt with in the National Security Concept. It was certainly not by chance 
that NATO’s practice of using military force without UN Security Council authorisation 
                                                          
14  See The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, June 28, 2000 in 
https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm [accessed on April 28, 2019]. 
15 This treaty stated that NATO and Russia did not consider each other as adversaries, sharing the goal of 
overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competition and of strengthening mutual trust and 
cooperation within a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe. See Founding Act on Mutual Relations, 
Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, May 27, 1997, in 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm [accessed on April 29, 2019]. 
16 See The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, cit. 
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was blamed of destabilising the entire strategic situation in the world. Moreover, a sort of 
warning to Washington was included in the passage affirming that one of the main threats 
to the international community was the possible emergence of foreign military bases in 
direct proximity to Russian borders. As concerned national interests, the Kremlin made a 
difference among individual, society and the State. In light on this, the interests of the 
individual consisted in the exercise of constitutional rights and liberties, in the assurance 
of personal security, in improved quality of life and standard of living, while the interests 
of society lay in strengthening democracy and the rule of law. On the other hand, the 
interests of the State consisted in the inviolability of the constitutional order, and Russia’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as in political, economic and social stability.17  
     According to Yeltsin’s successor, traditional Russian values had to be safeguarded in 
order to consolidate society and the State. In a few words, this project could be summed 
up in: a) patriotism, referring to the striving to make the country more prosperous, 
stronger and happier; b) the State as a strong great world Power, whose content was 
embodied not so much in its military might, as in its ability to be at the forefront to ensure 
the highest level of its people’s wellbeing, guarantee its stable security, and defend its 
interests in the international arena. Moreover, in order to integrate the economy into world 
economic structures, Russia had to be incorporated into the international system of 
regulation of foreign economic activity, above all into the World Trade Organisation.18 
This vision was strengthened by the Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, who marked that an 
important lesson had been missed from the end of the Cold War and the collapse of 
communism to promote a new world order based on a concord of great Powers, increased 
authority and efficiency of the United Nations. This new order was also supposed to 
involve multilateral security regimes in the Far East, Central and Southern Asia and other 
regions. Therefore, Moscow was expected to try to persuade NATO partners that the policy 
                                                          
17 See National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, approved by Presidential Decree No. 24 of 10 
January 2000, in http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ 
29/content/id/589768 [accessed on April 29, 2019]. 
18 See V. PUTIN, Russia at the Turn of the Millennium, December 30, 1999, in A. MELVILLE - T. SHAKLEINA, 
eds., Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities, Budapest-New York, NY, CEU Press, 
2005, pp. 221-234. 
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of further expanding the alliance was counterproductive and would lead to the formation 
of new dividing lines on the continents.19  
 
1. The Foundation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
  
The disintegration of the Soviet Union had created a new security situation in Central 
Asia, with a network of ethnic and religious tensions, territorial disputes and socio-
economic problems. The power vacuum due to the collapse of the communist State had 
facilitated the rise of Islamic fundamentalism requiring a common forum to collectively 
address the challenge. In consequence of that, the agenda for security consultation went 
beyond the traditional border issue, thus involving other questions of common concern, 
such as a more comprehensive military cooperation, as well as the collaboration to fight 
crime and drug trafficking.20 The two former superpowers of the Cold War in early June 
2000 signed a Joint Statement on Principles of Strategic Stability, through which they 
agreed that the international community was facing a dangerous and growing threat of 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. In consequence 
of that, such a threat had to be addressed through mutual cooperation and respect of each 
other’s security interests.21 As concerned Russia-U.S. relations, the new Head of the 
Kremlin stressed that the Anglo-Saxon nation was always one of Russia’s main partners, 
while at the same time the American President claimed the necessity to always have a 
good, stable relationship with a strong, prosperous and free Russia.22 Nonetheless, we 
also have to say that neither Russia nor China had ever hidden their will to become centres 
of power able to match the United States’ international stance. Both capitals were making 
                                                          
19  See I. IVANOV, Russian Foreign Policy on the Eve of the 21st Century: Problems of Formation, 
Development and Continuity, 2000, ibid., pp. 235-267.  
20 See J. WANG, China and SCO: Toward a New Type of Interstate Relations, in G. WU - H. LANSDOWNE, 
eds., China Turns to Multilateralism: Foreign Policy and Regional Security, London-New York, NY, 
Routledge, 2008, p. 80.  
21  See Russia-United States Joint Statement on Principles of Strategic Stability, in Public Papers of 
Presidents of the United States (thereafter PPUS), William J. Clinton, 2000, Book I, June 4, 2000, pp. 1076-
1077, in https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-2000-book1/html/PPP-2000-book1-doc-pg1076.htm 
[accessed on May 4, 2019]. 
22 See The President’s News Conference with President Vladimir Putin of Russia in Moscow, ibid., June 4, 
2000, pp. 1081-1085, in https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-2000-book1/html/PPP-2000-book1-
doc-pg1081-2.htm [accessed on May 4, 2019].  
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no secret that they wanted to acquire again a status of superpower; hence, the 
normalisation of their mutual relations was also a way to assist each other to achieve such 
a task.23 As a matter of fact, cooperation with the United States was something necessary 
for everyone, but while the Americans were persistent on the universality of human rights 
and democratic values, the Chinese President said that dialogue and cooperation in the 
field of human rights were supposed to be conducted on the basis of respect for State 
sovereignty: «The world is diverse and colourful», stated Jiang Zemin; on grounds of that, 
«Just as there should not be only one colour in the universe, so there should not be only 
one civilisation, one social system, one development model or one set of values in the 
world».24  
     In the same weeks, the so-called “Shanghai Five” decided to establish an international 
organisation for regional security and cooperation, whose basic idea was the preservation 
of the integrity of its member States, as well as the need to combat “separatist” movements 
and preventing outside interference.25 Just to give an example of the strategic importance 
of Central Asia, suffice is to say that Moscow feared that instability in the region would 
be exploited by Islamist fundamentalism,26  which was spreading in those years as a 
process of Islamisation of the society. Putin had decided to adopt a more active policy of 
                                                          
23 See A.J.K. BAILES - J.M. THÓRDISARDÓTTIR, The SCO and NATO, in FREDHOLM, ed., The Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization and Eurasian Geopolitics, cit., pp. 92-93. 
24 See Statement by President Jiang Zemin of the People’s Republic of China at the Millennium Summit of 
the United Nations, September 6, 2000, in https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_ 
665391/t24962.shtml [accessed on May 5, 2019].  
25 On April 26, 1996, Russia, China, and the three former Soviet Central Asian Republics of Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan had signed a treaty in Shanghai on demilitarising the more than seven-thousand-
km-long border between China and the former Soviet Union. The Regional Security Pact stated that 
strengthening security and maintaining peace and stability in the area was an important contribution to the 
maintenance of peace in the Asia-Pacific region. See Agreement between the Russian Federation, the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan and the People’s Republic of China 
on Confidence-Building in the Military Field in the Border Area (“Shanghai Declaration”), 1996, in 
MELVILLE - SHAKLEINA, eds., Russian Foreign Policy in Transition, cit., pp. 65-73. 
26 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the first Russian Foreign Minister, Kozyrev, had stated that 
Moscow had to be ready to play its part in the containment of “Islamic extremism” on behalf of the civilised 
world. See M. MESBAHI, Russian Foreign Policy towards Central Asia: The Emerging Doctrine, in I. 
OLDBERG, ed., Priorities in Russian Foreign Policy: West, South, East? Proceedings of a Conference in 
Stockholm, 3 June 1996, FOA Rapport, R-97-00391-180, Swedish National Defence Research 
Establishment (FOA), Stockholm, 1997.  
A New Balance of Power for the Twenty-First Century 
13 
reversing the trend and thus strengthening Russian influence in the area.27 On the other 
hand, consistent with the Chinese New Security Concept, the Dushanbe Statement of July 
5, 2000, called for the transformation of the Five into a regional structure for multilateral 
cooperation. Pivotally important was the reference to the United Nations Charter 
confirming the right of each country to choose its own way of political, economic and 
social development.28 Soon afterwards, Vladimir Putin attended a Russo-Chinese summit 
in Beijing on July 18. The consequent Declaration stressed the inadmissibility of the use 
of armed force in contravention of the U.N. Security Council, and denounced 
international terrorism, ethnic separatism and religious extremism as a serious threat to 
peace, but also contained an unequivocal message that Beijing and Moscow did not accept 
American dominance in the world.29  
     In light of all this, on July 16, 2001, Russia and China signed the Treaty of Good 
Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation, stating that both sides supported each other 
in defending national unity and territorial integrity, as well as conducting cooperation in 
world financial institutions and economic organisations. Moreover, the contracting parties 
committed themselves not to join any alliance or be a party to any bloc with a third country 
compromising the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of both nations.30 The 
previous month, the members of the Shanghai Five, with the addition of Uzbekistan, had 
founded the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, whose goals were the strengthening of 
mutual trust, friendship and good-neighbourliness, efficient cooperation in political, 
trade, economic, scientific and technological spheres, with the mutual commitment to 
maintain peace, security and stability in the region. The leading principle was the so called 
Shanghai Spirit, characterised by respect for the variety of cultures, and aspiration for 
                                                          
27 See L. JONSON, Russian and Central Asia, in R. ALLISON - L. JONSON, eds., Central Asian Security: The 
New International Context, Washington, D.C., London, Brookings Institution - Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 2001, pp. 100-101. 
28 See Dushanbe Declaration by the Heads of State of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the People’s Republic 
of China, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, and the Republic of Tajikistan, July 5, 2000, in 
MELVILLE - SHAKLEINA, eds., Russian Foreign Policy in Transition, cit., pp. 147-152. 
29 See Vladimir Putin Met with Jiang Zemin, President of the People’s Republic of China, July 18, 2000, in 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/38413 [accessed on May 6, 2019]. 
30 See Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People’s Republic of China 
and the Russian Federation, July 16, 2001, in https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/ 
2649_665393/t15771.shtml [accessed on May 8, 2019]. 
Bruno Pierri 
14 
joint development.31 On the same day, another important convention was signed, that is 
the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, which 
were the “three evils” to struggle against. As a matter of fact, terrorism was interpreted 
as any deed aimed at causing death of anyone not taking active part in hostilities in the 
situation of an armed conflict.32 On the other hand, separatism was regarded as any act 
aimed at breaching the territorial integrity of a State. Finally, extremism was defined as 
any deed aimed at a violent seizure of power, or change of the constitutional order.33 
     As concerned the Russians, they understood that China’s influence in Central Asia 
was growing. Hence, the most reasonable thing to do was coordinating regional cooper-
ation with Beijing. Second, the SCO came to be seen as something like a counterbalance 
to Western economic and political structures. Apart from that, Russia wanted to utilise 
SCO mechanisms to harness China’s economic power for the development of its own 
economy.34 Following the events of September 2001, the Kremlin effectively supported 
US operations in Afghanistan and pursued a corresponding policy in the SCO. In an 
interview with «Vremya Novostey» newspaper on July 24, 2003, Alexander Losyukov, 
deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, spoke about the fight against the terrorist 
threat in Central Asia: «Neither we nor China are glad that the American military presence 
appeared in Central Asia […] We could […] not cope with that [terrorist] threat either 
alone or with China’s help […] An American presence emerged as a result of the struggle 
against that threat […] We see the USA not as an adversary, but as a partner in this 
struggle[…]».35 
                                                          
31 See Declaration on the Creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, June 15, 2001, in MELVILLE 
- SHAKLEINA, eds., Russian Foreign Policy in Transition, cit., pp. 181-184. 
32 China has applied the Three Evils approach in particular to the ethnic Uyghur population concentrated in 
Xinjiang. Uyghurs and international human rights monitoring groups have voiced strong concerns regarding 
policies and practices of the Chinese government, including Han settlement in the province, and the 
resulting impact on Uyghurs’ distinct culture, language, and religion. See Human Rights in China and 
Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, in 
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/china0405/ [accessed on May 9, 2019].  
33 See The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, June 15, 2001, in 
Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights: The Impact of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Human 
Rights in China Whitepaper, March 2011, New York, NY-Hong Kong, in 
https://www.hrichina.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdfs/2011-hric-sco-whitepaper-full.pdf [accessed 
on May 8, 2019].  
34 See A. LUKIN, China and Russia: The New Rapprochement, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2018, pp. 84-85. 
35 Ibid., p. 85.  
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     A few months afterwards, in his first meeting with Jiang Zemin, President Bush said 
that, in the long run, the advance of Chinese prosperity depended on China’s full 
integration into the rules and norms of international institutions.36 The Chinese leader also 
stated that China and the United States shared common responsibility and interest in 
maintaining peace and security in the Asia Pacific and the world at large. Hence, they 
were bound to work together to combat terrorism through the development a constructive 
and cooperative relationship.37 On November 14, 2001, the Heads of State of Russia and 
the United States issued a joint statement, announcing the common determination to meet 
the threats to peace in the new century, that is terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, militant nationalism, ethnic and religious intolerance, and regional 
instability. The two leaders claimed they recognised some common values such as market 
economy, freedom of economic choice and an open democratic society.38 Despite such 
declarations of intent, Moscow and Beijing claimed the right to develop these questions 
according to their own doctrine. Such an approach was confirmed once again by the 
President of China during an interview to the New York Times. Jiang resolutely affirmed 
that a direct democratic election would not work in the Asian country. Should China apply 
parliamentary democracy, the only result would be lack of food and great chaos.39 What 
worried Moscow and Beijing most in those years were the military operations the 
Americans had conducted in the Persian Gulf and especially in the Balkans. This 
suggested that neither prospective adversaries nor international organisations seemed to 
pose much of a constraint on Washington’s decisions about where and when to act abroad. 
Since both Russia and China had territories over which they were seeking to secure 
                                                          
36 See The President’s News Conference with President Jiang Zemin of China in Shanghai, October 19, 
2001, in PPPUS, George W. Bush, 2001, Book II, pp. 1262-1265, in 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1262.pdf [accessed 
on May 10, 2019]. 
37 See U.S., China Stand against Terrorism: Remarks by President Bush and President Jiang Zemin in 
Press Availability, Western Suburb Guest House, Shanghai, October 19, 2001, in https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011019-4.html [accessed on May 10, 2019].  
38 See Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on a New Relationship 
between the United States and Russia, November 14, 2001, in PPPUS, George W. Bush, 2001, Book II, pp. 
1399-1400, in https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011114-3.html 
[accessed on May 10, 2019]. 
39 See In Jiang’s Words: “I Hope the Western World Can Understand China Better”, August 10, 2001, in 
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sovereign control, that is Chechnya and Taiwan, they felt increasingly embarrassed of the 
role that a more fearless United States might decide to play.40 From this point of view, 
strategic partnership with the United States was supposed to better enable China to cope 
with the potentially dangerous constraints of American hegemony during the Asian 
country’s rise to great power status. In a few words, the reason leading the United States 
to build a partnership with China was the threat that its collapse might lead Beijing to: a) 
give other partners preferential economic treatment; b) complicate US diplomacy by 
exercising China’s veto in the UN Security Council; c) be less circumspect in its export 
controls on sensitive military technologies to countries about which the United States had 
strong concerns; d) be less helpful in containing regional tension in Korea or South Asia.41 
     Despite the common struggle against terrorism and Sino-Russian support for the 
American position, and the collaboration offered by the four Central Asian members of 
the SCO, the national interests of each one were clearly different. On one hand, in fact, 
Putin did not miss the chance to improve Russo-US relations by accepting the US military 
presence in Central Asia and expressed his desire that the US understand Russian battles 
against “terrorist” action in Chechnya. In contrast, China faced a more serious situation, 
as Washington had not changed its position of expressing concern over Beijing’s policy 
towards the Uyghurs. The US presence in Central Asia and the possible eastward 
enlargement of NATO, therefore, directly pressed west China and the Xinjiang 
Autonomous region. Besides, Uzbekistan immediately accepted the proposal to deploy 
American armed forces on its territory. Even Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan agreed with the 
American presence in their own territories. Such a pro-American policy, conducted by 
supposedly Russian-dominated States in Central Asia, illustrated how deeply the national 
interests of countries within the SCO collided with one another.42  
     At the same time, according to many Chinese scholars the SCO and the Shanghai Spirit 
representing the organisation underlined a sort of “new regionalism”, in contrast with the 
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old one, embodied by the European Union as a group of countries sharing similar 
ideology, history, culture, and economic system. On the other hand, new regionalism was 
based on the expansion of trade and the tackling of mutual problems, focusing much less 
on similarities among members. Besides, while old regionalism seemed to surrender 
sovereignty in favour of greater integration, SCO ideology maintained the primacy of 
sovereignty. Just to confirm that, suffice it to quote the Chinese security concept of 2002, 
whose core stated that all countries should transcend differences in ideology and social 
system. Within this context, the SCO was regarded as a successful case, through which its 
members had properly resolved their border issues, taking also the lead in making an 
unequivocal stand and proposition of combating terrorism, separatism and extremism.43 
Apart from that, there was also the wish to tie China to the region in a way to lessen the 
Sino-Soviet conflict over Central Asia. The SCO might have become the best way for 
Moscow to manage the growing power of the Chinese and its attraction for the countries 
of the afore mentioned area. In this way, Russia was allowed to go back to the region, 
with the further advantage to reduce its role enough to make the SCO appear more 
attractive than regional structures dominated by the former communist superpower.44 
Actually, Monika Pawar says that for Russia the main task of the SCO has always been 
security and standing up to the West, while for the Chinese equally important is economic 
cooperation. This implies that Central Asia members could enjoy diversification of their 
economies, thus linking away from excessive dependence on Russia.45    
     In the meantime, facing the common threat of Islamism, Washington, Beijing and 
Moscow recognised international terrorism as the primary menace to global security. 
Such convergence was made further manifest when Bush and Putin jointly announced 
that Russia and the United States were committed to economic cooperation, having 
launched a major new energy partnership to allow private firms to develop and transform 
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the vast energy reserves of Russia and the Caspian area through multiple pipelines.46 
George W. Bush in the same days  announced that his government would support WTO 
membership for Russia. 47  The US Department of Commerce granted Russia market 
economy status in June 2002, and announced that the USA and the former communist 
country would start bilateral negotiations on WTO accession. Nonetheless, such a first 
class relationship between the two rivals of the Cold War was rather questionable. In fact, 
the Americans aimed at using their position of strength and influence to create a balance 
of power favouring freedom. This involved Russia as an important partner in the war on 
terror, but also with the outlook to reach a future of greater democracy and economic 
freedom. As concerned China, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 
Condoleezza Rice, said that Washington was collaborating with Beijing on issues ranging 
from the fight against terror to maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula.48 On the 
other hand, Kremlin leaders were becoming increasingly apprehensive about US 
unilateralism and felt they were losing ground in the area of the former Soviet 
Republics.49 To add confirmation to this, we always have to remember that the White 
House National Security Strategy, issued in September 2002, criticised Moscow’s uneven 
commitment to the basic values of free-market democracy. In particular, the United States 
policy sought to refocus the relationship with Russia to broaden the cooperation in the 
global war on terrorism, while at the same time bolstering the independence and stability 
of the States of the former Soviet Union in the belief that a prosperous and stable 
neighbourhood would reinforce Russia’s growing commitment to integration into the 
Euro-Atlantic community. Despite these nice words, the document stated that Russia’s 
attitude towards human rights issues remained matter of great concern. Washington 
                                                          
46 See The President’s News Conference with President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia in Moscow, May 24, 
2002, in PPPUS, George W. Bush, 2002, Book I, pp. 861-867, in https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-
2002-book1/html/PPP-2002-book1-doc-pg861.htm [accessed on May 11, 2019]. 
47  See President Bush, President Putin Discuss Free Market Economy:  
Remarks by President Bush and President Putin to Students at St. Petersburg University, 
May 25, 2002, in https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020525-2.html 
[accessed on May 11, 2019]. 
48 See C. RICE, A Balance of Power that Favors Freedom, October 1, 2002, New York City, NY, in 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=3462 [accessed on May 11, 2019]. 
49 See J. WILHELMSEN - G. FLIKKE, Chinese-Russian Convergence and Central Asia, in «Geopolitics», XVI, 
4, 2011, p. 868. 
A New Balance of Power for the Twenty-First Century 
19 
accused also Beijing of being committed to national one-party rule and still hoped that 
only by fully respect people’s rights could China reach its full potential.50  
     To tell the truth, such an approach was not shared by the Chinese, for Jiang Zemin 
repeated that Beijing stood for democracy in international relations respecting different 
development models, being ready to work with the international community to boost 
world multi-polarisation. The Chinese leadership claimed that politically all countries 
should respect and consult one another and should not seek to impose their will. 
Economically they should pursue common development and should not create a 
polarisation of wealth.51 Beside this, the Chinese scholar Lu-Zhong-Wei thinks that the 
“Shanghai Spirit” was characterised by the so-called “five Cs”, that is confidence, 
communication, cooperation, co-existence, and common interest. According to this 
interpretation, the SCO showed to the world that a system of regional security could be 
founded on the basis of cooperation, rather than military competition, thus ending up in a 
situation of win-win. Concerning this, the Indian scholar Devendra Kaushik said that for 
the first time a new mechanism for ensuring security had been formed through peaceful 
means, rather than reliance on exclusively military alliances.52 From this point of view, 
he then said, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was based on security through 
cooperation, meeting the challenges of a non-conventional nature, such as drug and arms 
traffic, refugee problems, questions of energy. To conclude, Kaushik did not portray the 
SCO as a NATO of the East. Rather, it was an altogether different type of regional 
cooperation, which he thought could play a very constructive role in finding a solution by 
undertaking development.53 
     Russia and China had entered the new century with an array of agreements on political, 
military, and border issues that helped turn their border into a zone of good 
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neighbourliness, stability, and cooperation. As an evidence of this, on June 7, 2002, the 
Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was signed in St. Petersburg, whose 
main tasks were set to be: a) mutual trust, friendship and good neighbourliness; b) 
promotion of a new democratic, fair and rational political and economic international 
order; c) joint struggle against terrorism, separatism and extremism in all their 
manifestations; d) balanced economic growth, social and cultural development in the 
region. Furthermore, the document highlighted the following principles: 1) mutual respect 
of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and inviolability of State borders; b) 
equality of all members, and search of common positions on the basis of mutual 
understanding; c) gradual implementation of joint activities in the areas of mutual interest; 
d) prevention of any illegitimate acts directed against SCO interests.54 The SCO members 
wanted to build their relations in the framework of an emerging multi-polar system of 
international relations and believed that the world order of the XXI century should be 
based on the mechanisms of collective resolution of key issues, in strict accordance with 
the UN Charter. On grounds of this, the effective functioning of the Organisation was said 
to be facilitated by the expeditious implementation of procedures for the ratification of 
the SCO Charter and the Agreement on the Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS) of the 
SCO. 55  Among the key aims of the RATS there were: 1) developing proposals and 
recommendations on strengthening cooperation in combating terrorism, separatism, and 
extremism; 2) assisting the competent agencies of the Parties in combating terrorism, 
separatism, and extremism; 3) collecting and analysing information provided to RATS by 
the Parties on issues of combating terrorism, separatism, and extremism.56 Moreover, the 
members of the organisation managed to combine China, a massive world energy 
consumer, with high profile energy producers like Kazakhstan and an unmatched 
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hydropower producer such as Tajikistan.57 In a few words, the SCO enjoyed the outlook 
of becoming a huge labour supply and consuming market, attracting foreign investments 
towards the Eurasian and Asia-Pacific region. Besides, stability in the area was thought 
to provide the sufficient amount of supplies to turn the SCO into a cartel of energy.58 
     President Putin visited China in early December 2002. The consequent Joint 
Declaration of Russia and China said that the two governments were resolved to continue 
applying persistent efforts to raise the standards of friendly and mutually beneficially 
cooperation of the two countries. An important passage of the Declaration was the one 
taking into account the great significance of cooperation in the energy sphere, aiming at 
ensuring the prompt implementation of the existing agreements concerning Russian-
Chinese oil and gas pipelines, as well as coordinating the implementation of promising 
energy projects to ensure the long-term and stable nature of oil and gas supplies.59 Such 
a policy matched Russia’s interests in Central Asia, which were mainly two-fold: a) 
integrating the Central Asian States in the CIS sphere and making them close allies; b) 
denying external Powers strategic access to Central Asia. At the same time, however, 
there was the intention to counterbalance the increasing ties being made by Central Asian 
States with Western Powers.60 On the other hand, another Power pushing to promote 
closer economic and trade ties with Central Asia, especially in the energy sector, was 
China, which was about to become the world’s second largest consumer of petroleum 
products.61 By virtue of this, China aimed at successfully accomplishing two of its main 
goals, dealing respectively with stability of Western borders, first of all in the Xinjiang 
province, and positioning itself as a major player in the race to exploit and develop Central 
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Asia’s energy sources, also flooding the area with Chinese goods.62 To sum up, China 
sought to promote peace and cooperation and rejected the notions of the “new great game” 
and sphere of influence. Beijing promoted the development of the SCO as a regional 
organisation for political and economic cooperation, not as a military alliance. Then, 
China’s Central Asia policy focused on six specific areas: border security; combating the 
East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM); energy security; economic interests; geo-
political stability; and the SCO.63  
 
2. The Energy Link 
 
As it is easy to realise, the American Administration had been monitoring the energy 
market in the Caspian area for already a few years, as several CIA Intelligence reports 
show. What worried Washington was above all the need for China to boost its energy 
sector and find new sources of supply in the Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea regions, thus 
increasing competition with American firms. 64  As regarded trade relations with the 
Russians, Washington analysts believed that in the following three years such a 
relationship would be developed in an uneven way, since on one hand Russian arms 
delivery to Beijing was supposed to grow; on the other hand, the CIA predicted that 
commercial relations would remain stagnant. At the same time, the closeness of their 
collaboration was expected to be limited by their mutual distrust.65 What the Intelligence 
focused the attention on, moreover, was the fact that China’s growing energy demand 
would soon be turned into a chance for Russia to supply more oil and gas to the Dragon. 
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In a few words, oil and gas trade between these two countries would also end up affecting 
American policy efforts in the region.66 
     Less than two years after these reports, the Russian Foreign Minister practically 
confirmed such a trend by stating that the volume of trade with China, especially in the 
energy sector, had by then reached a record level of almost 12 billion dollars. In a few 
words, the two States were beginning to regard each other as strategically important 
markets, thus strengthening the material base of the entire range of bilateral relations.67 
Soon afterwards, the new Chinese President, Hu Jintao, visited Russia on May 26-30, 
2003. 68  On such occasion, he and Putin on May 27 signed a joint declaration on 
implementing the strategic partnership concept, which, as concerned economic questions, 
included the following points: a) China, after becoming a member in 2001, supported 
Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organisation; b) both sides were willing to develop 
bilateral and regional cooperation in the fields of economy, trade, military technology, 
energy, finance, information technology. The two leaders also confirmed their mutual 
understanding that «[…] no matter what changes the world may go through, the 
strengthening of friendly and good neighbourly relations […] between Russia and China 
will always remain a strategic priority…».69  
     As regards the newly-elected Chinese leader, one of the first analyses was the one 
produced by Willy Wo-Lap Man, who reminds how the Leading Group on Foreign 
Affairs was particularly sensitive about an “anti-China containment policy” supposedly 
being spearheaded by Washington. Despite relatively stable relations with the United 
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States, Beijing felt increasingly alarmed by the ongoing close military alliance between 
the United States and Japan. Also pivotal was the leadership’s attention on guaranteeing 
sufficient and reliable supplies of oil and gas and policy makers started waging 
“petroleum diplomacy”. The team led by President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen 
Jiabao elaborated a strategy to ensure energy imports not only from neighbouring and 
Asian countries, but also suppliers as far away as Africa and South America.70 In the past, 
Jiang Zemin had basically divided the world into power blocs made of the United States, 
the European Union, Japan, China, and Russia, thus creating the situation that Chinese 
experts had characterised as yichao duoqiang (“one superpower, several powers”). In this 
context, the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership was convinced that Beijing could 
gradually play the role of a big Power.71 For Jiang Zemin, the key to whether China could 
live up to the reality and obligations of a “great power” in world affairs depended very 
much on ties with the United States. Therefore, he had pursued a “pro-US” policy, thus 
recognising American supremacy in the world, provided that Washington respected 
Chinese suzerainty over Taiwan and continued to trade with and invest in China. Jiang 
and former president Bill Clinton got along to the extent that the Chinese President had 
raised the possibility of cementing a bilateral “constructive strategic partnership”. 72 
Instead, Hu pointed out that, in order to keep a cooperative partnership, the United States 
was expected to acquiesce on China’s harsh policies in Xinjiang and Tibet in return for 
Beijing’s support of the global war on terrorism.73 As an evidence of this, during Jiang 
Zemin’s last summit with Bush in late 2002, the latter told that «[…] no nation’s efforts 
to counter terrorism should be used to justify suppressing minorities or silencing peaceful 
dissent». 74  Despite this, the White House had toned down its criticism of Chinese 
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behaviour in Xinjiang and Tibet. In fact, for the first time since Tiananmen, Washington 
had decided in 2002 not to sponsor an “anti-China” motion at the UN Commission on 
Human Rights at Geneva. During his tour of Asia and Australia in 2003, Bush pronounced 
himself encouraged by China’s cooperation in the war on terror, and President Hu 
reciprocated when he said they were going to develop healthy and stable Sino-US 
relations.75 
     As concerned energy issues, in January 2003 the Japanese Prime Minister, Junichiro 
Koizumi, had signed in Moscow a six-point plan of cooperation in economics, energy and 
international diplomacy. By reading the document, we can find out that Japan-Russia 
energy consultations had been convened and feasibility studies had been implemented to 
find areas for joint implementation projects. Moreover, both sides shared the recognition 
that the realisation of a project in the Russian Far East and the Siberian region to develop 
energy resources and construct a pipeline would be of mutual benefit and would 
contribute to the improvement of the stability and the energy security of the Asia-Pacific 
region.76 Another strategic reason spurring China’s entry into the Central Asian energy 
market was the need to reduce dependency on sea lines of communications for oil 
transport. In particular, in case of international crisis or terrorist attack, the crude flow 
through the vulnerable Strait of Malacca could have been easily disrupted. As regards this 
question, a serious contribution to research is the one given by Thrassy N. Marketos, who 
says that there were five factors driving Chinese engagement in Central Asia, that is: a) 
economic development in Xinjiang; b) domestic political stability; c) regional stability; 
d) energy security; e) implementation of an alternative transport corridor to Europe.77   
     As regarded Russia, Putin wanted to turn his country into a sort of economic tiger 
integrated into world economic systems, being at the same time the dominant regional 
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Power within the former Soviet Union area, especially by playing the card of energy 
supplies. Just to give an example, Fiona Hill mentions that Russia transformed itself from 
a defunct military superpower into a new energy superpower, making the energy sector 
represent Russian State interests globally.78 In late May 2002, at a summit in Moscow, 
the US and Russia had announced a strategic energy dialogue that would focus on bringing 
more Russian oil to world markets.79 In short, energy issues had opened the door to 
bilateral cooperation with the United States. Actually, Washington wanted to diversify 
energy supplies and avoid dependence on oil coming from the turbulent and unstable 
Persian Gulf, while Russia was looking for new potential markets, at the same time 
needing investment in high-risk exploration or a technologically challenging 
development.80 A second point of convergence was that Russia was becoming a premier 
energy producer, while the United States was the largest oil and gas consumer in the 
world. As such, the US oil majors had both the means and the interest to pursue expansion 
in Russia. So important had become diversification of supplies, that the US Energy 
Information Administration assumed that the developing countries in Asia would account 
for 37 per cent of the total world energy demand growth by 2020, with the risk of getting 
extremely dependent on unstable Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries for their 
economic survival.81 The fact that the SCO included both major energy exporters and 
significant importers, ended up making energy one of the main topics of this organisation. 
However, several factors seemed to be limiting Sino-Russian collaboration, as Moscow 
feared that Chinese investments in Eurasian corridors could hurt the Russian Far East’s 
development, and possibly damage its territorial integrity. As a matter of fact, the SCO 
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allowed Russia to monitor China’s activities and contain them, but at the same time 
provided China with a forum to assert its security and economic interests.82  
     Within a scenario like this, Russia’s Energy Strategy of 2003 explicitly mentioned 
energy resources as a political instrument and as a key way to dominate that particular 
sector.83 To be honest, the Russian Energy Strategy to 2020 may be considered as the 
main “ideological foundation” for the national development policy, also defining energy 
exports as a major instrument of Russian foreign policy. Just to give an idea, we can 
summarise the main goals of the Strategy like this: a) exporting energy resources; b) 
transporting energy mostly from Central Asia to Europe; c) attracting foreign investments 
to the national energy sector; d) promoting the exploration and production activities of 
the Russian fuel-energy sector abroad; e) increasing the presence of Russian companies 
in foreign markets.84 The main external challenge of the energy sector dealt with the 
necessity to overcome the threats associated with the instability of world energy markets 
and volatility of prices, as well as to ensure the contribution of the energy factor into 
improvement of foreign economic activities and to reinforcement of Russia’s position in 
the world economic system.85  
     According to Leonid Grigoriev, Russia’s approach to regional energy issues may be 
better understood if we keep in mind all the objectives of outside actors, particularly their 
attempts to return to a buyer’s market and build transit routes to bypass Russia.86 In order 
to avoid such a stranglehold, Moscow decided to use the Siberian region as a “strategic 
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gateway” in pursuing Asia-Pacific energy diplomacy.87 According to the Russian Energy 
Strategy, the volume of oil export, which was 145 million tons in 2000, was estimated to 
increase to more than 300 million tons in 2020. However, exports to Europe were to 
increase in the period 2000-2020 only from 127.5 million to 160 million tons, or 1.1 
percent per annum. An increase of the same scope was expected for the exports to the CIS 
countries, whereas oil exports to other countries, like the USA and China, were going to 
rise to about 100 million tons in 2010. Thus, the increase of oil exports was clearly 
expected to shift from West to East.88 
     As a matter of fact, the relationship between China and Russia was a typical one 
between two great Powers, tilting between pragmatic considerations urging both sides to 
co‐operate, and deep‐rooted suspicion due to disputes in history. For example, Russia’s 
Eastern regions are sparsely populated and bordering with a heavily populated Chinese 
territory. Moreover, Russia was concerned about China’s rise, which could threaten its 
position as a regional superpower. From such a point of view, fuelling Chinese 
modernisation by supplying energy could be seen as jeopardising Russia’s own interest. 
In a word, the key dimension of the SCO was always the Sino‐Russian relationship, as 
there was a lot of common ground for both Moscow and Beijing to co‐operate. 
Dependency was reciprocal, since Russia needed China to access Asian market and to 
promote the economy development of its Eastern regions. On the other hand, Central 
Asian/Caspian countries offered the best available option for China to reduce its 
dependence on the Gulf (as well as Russia) and help avoid the “Malacca dilemma”. 
Therefore, it was no surprise that China had made this region a cornerstone of its energy 
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security policy.89 What made not only the United States, but also Russia’s neighbours 
rather suspicious were also some comments made in Moscow about the Kremlin’s 
strategic leverage. For example, Anatoliy Chubais, chief executive officer of UES, 
Russia’s electric-power company, argued in 2003 that Russia should lead the former 
Soviet republics through an “economic occupation” of neighbouring economies. In his 
view, Russian investors were thought to purchase foreign debts and acquire strategic 
economic assets in CIS countries.90  
     The establishment of the SCO demonstrated that procurement of oil was deemed a 
national security issue in China. As concerned Beijing’s strategy to pursue national 
energy interests, it was based on the following steps; a) establishing strong commercial 
ties around oil and energy supplies; b) considering military interests and acting upon; c) 
should China ever decide that its commercial interests were not sufficiently protected, 
activating the SCO to use the Chinese military to secure those interests.91 With this in 
mind, it was obvious for China to become interested in acquiring oil and gas reserves 
from foreign sources, including those countries hit by American sanctions, such as Iran, 
Iraq, Libya, and the Sudan.92 Actually, the policy of seeking sources abroad was the 
ratification by the government of national oil companies’ early efforts to invest in other 
countries. When the China National Petroleum Corporation first sought to invest 
overseas, in 1992 in Peru and in 1996 in Sudan and Venezuela, it had not obtained 
government approval. However, after China had joined the World Trade Organisation, 
the idea of creating national enterprises that could be competitive internationally gained 
ground.93 To be more precise, in 2003 the Chinese government launched a programme 
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called the “Twenty-First-Century Oil Strategy”, allocating 100 billion dollars for a 
“futuristic strategic oil system”, covering a ten-point-scheme, which claimed: 1) 
diversifying oil import sources; 2) co-developing oil and gas wells in other countries; 3) 
setting up the national oil reserve and security guarantee mechanism; 4) initiating the 
national oil foundation to construct a platform for oil finances and futures; 5) re-starting 
the National Energy Commission to deal with oil security affairs; 6) cutting out some 
reliable marine oil transport lines; 7) preparing strategic oil reserves in northwest China; 
8) encouraging a frugal and efficient oil consumption; 9) organising a couple of titanic 
oil corporations; 10) restructuring the energy consumption regime to reduce dependence 
on oil.94 In 2005 the State Council established a State Energy Leadership Group headed 
by Premier Wen Jiabao. Energy security was prioritised in the 11th Five-year Plan of 
2005, emphasising energy conservation, the environment, climate change and green 
energy.95  
     This spurt in China’s energy usage required a corresponding increase in the 
consumption of all major sources of energy: coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear energy, and 
hydropower. According to the US Department of Energy, between 2005 and 2030 
Beijing’s net energy use was estimated to increase by 131 percent, a far bigger gain than 
that expected for any other country. Over the course of this period, China’s share of world 
energy usage was estimated to jump from 14.5 to 22.3 per cent. Even more significant, 
China was expected to overtake the United States to be the world’s leading consumer of 
energy.96 The fact that China established close ties to countries considered unfriendly to 
the United States was of course seen in Washington as a provocation. Furthermore, in the 
effort to cement its relations with these suppliers, the Chinese also provided them with 
military and diplomatic aid. The seriousness with which top US officials viewed these 
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activities was noticeably evident in the Pentagon 2005 report on Chinese strategy and 
capabilities, The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, which for the first 
time highlighted energy competition as a significant factor in US-Chinese security affairs: 
«Beijing’s belief that it requires such special relationships in order to secure its energy 
access could shape its defense strategy and force planning […]», thus, presumably, posing 
a potential threat to US national security through a more activist military presence abroad. 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, we can read in the report, had stated that the shortage of oil 
and gas resources had become a restricting factor in the country’s economic and social 
development, thus calling upon China to implement a strategy for sustainable 
development of domestic oil and natural gas resources. For the foreseeable future, 
however, China was reported to rely on overseas sources. Hence, this dependence was 
playing a role in shaping the Dragon’s strategy and policy, especially when dealing with 
long-term supply agreements with producers, as well as with countries located along key 
geostrategic chokepoints.97 In 2005, the Bush Administration responded to what it saw as 
a continued Chinese challenge to American efforts to contain Iran by supporting India’s 
pursuit of nuclear energy, while maintaining its sanctions against Chinese acquisition of 
the same technologies.98 It was also true that the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
granted Iran, together with Pakistan and India, observer status in 2005, but this did not 
necessarily mean a deliberate challenge to U.S. interests and dominance in the Persian 
Gulf and the wider Middle Eastern region. After all, having Iran in the SCO framework 
was meaningful for the organisation to be effective in combating terrorism in Central 
Asia.99 As a matter of fact, China viewed that area as a vital source of energy, posing 
fewer security risks than maritime imports. Moreover, the region was much more stable 
than the Persian Gulf or the Middle East. What is more, President Hu Jintao used the 
                                                          
97 See A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2000: The 
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005, Office of the Secretary of Defense, in 
https://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/dod-2005.pdf [accessed on May 30, 2019]. 
98 See S.R. WEISMAN, U.S. to Broaden India’s Access to Nuclear-Power Technology, in «The New York 
Times», July 19, 2005, in https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/19/washington/us-to-broaden-indias-access-
to-nuclearpower-technology.html [accessed on May 30, 2019]. 
99 See Z. DAOJIONG, China’s Energy Security and its International Relations, in «The China and Eurasia 
Forum Quarterly», Energy and Security, III, 3, November 2005, p. 50.  
Bruno Pierri 
32 
expression “Malacca Dilemma” to describe China’s increasing risks of importing by sea, 
due to pirate or terrorist attacks, or potential trade disruptions by another hostile Power.100  
     With the passing of time, China’s expectations of the SCO escalated. First of all, 
Beijing attached more importance to cooperation in fighting against terrorism in the wake 
of the 9/11 attacks. Then, it made greater efforts to promote trade and investment among 
SCO members. Finally, as the international profile of the organisation increased, China 
began to use the SCO as a platform for advocating a Chinese version of multilateral 
cooperation. In his speech at the 2005 summit, President Hu Jintao stated that China 
hoped that the SCO could better deal with new challenges, advance regional development, 
maintain regional stability, and fulfil common prosperity through deepening and 
expanding bilateral and multilateral cooperation. In particular, to promote economic 
cooperation it was important to strengthen coordination for the establishment of a banking 
union, and carry out cooperation with international financial institutions.101 In short, to 
the Chinese government the SCO had become not only a source of security in an uncertain 
and threatening world, but also an opportunity for expanding its market, diversifying its 
energy supplies, demonstrating to the world the benign nature of China’s rise, and 
advocating a new type of multilateral cooperation.102 However, Russia and the Central 
Asian countries showed a certain caution, being more oriented towards a multilateral 
market and the removal of a de facto Chinese economic takeover of that area.103 In the 
same period, Russia’s President Putin stressed bilateral economic ties, especially the work 
of Russian energy companies in China. In addition, in November 2005 the two 
governments agreed to double oil exports to China and to consider constructing an oil 
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pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from Eastern Siberia to 
China’s Far East.104  
 
3. The Sino-Russian Connection   
     
One of the main works on the SCO is the monograph by Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience, 
stressing how the partnership between the two leaders of the East was based on strategic 
common interests and a shared vision of national priorities. The author underlines two 
main reasons of Russia’s rationale for partnership with China. The first one was what 
could be called “global strategic”. In a few words, Russia at the end of the second Putin 
mandate was far more stable and more influential abroad, but it was still a relatively minor 
player on the world stage. Hence, the Russian President understood that his country 
needed to make common cause with other Powers in order to exercise a serious influence 
in international affairs. From this point of view, China represented both the present and 
the future, with apparently unlimited economic, political, and military potential. Russia 
was supposed to become the strategic, as well as civilisational, bridge between East and 
West, and possibly even the “third pole” in the multi-polar world of the future. On the 
other hand, Beijing did not view Russia as a strategic counterweight to the United States. 
Moscow was regarded as too weak to perform such a role and, in any event, it would be 
reluctant to act on behalf of Chinese interests. Moreover, China was believed to enjoy far 
greater strategic choice than Russia, due to working relations with the United States and 
the EU, close ties with ASEAN members and the Republic of Korea, as well as an 
expanding Chinese presence in Africa and South America. In short, Beijing was 
committed to portraying the “strategic partnership” with Russia as a supplement, not an 
alternative, to its burgeoning ties with the United States and Europe. Energy was another 
major dividend of the partnership with Moscow. Moscow saw energy as the twenty-first-
century equivalent of nuclear weapons, that is the main instrument of power projection. 
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Within this vision, China served as leverage against the West. For Beijing, however, 
Russia was only one of the many suppliers of its energy needs.105 
     A somewhat different point of view is the one expressed by Alexander Lukin in the 
recent work China and Russia, highlighting how Beijing saw that the two countries shared 
common views on most international issues, and above all both envisaged a future world 
based on multi-polarity. The Chinese Foreign Minister explained this unity in an 
interview on June 24, 2007: «China and Russia hold common positions on such major 
issues as working to establish a multi-polar world, and establishing a just and rational 
international order».106 To summarise, Lukin stresses the following reasons motivating 
Moscow’s needs: 1) cooperation with China was extremely important to Russia’s geopo-
litical and international interests, as both pursued a world not dominated by a single 
Power; 2) China was an important strategic partner for Russia, as the Kremlin’s desire to 
become increasingly independent and powerful naturally made it necessary to develop 
relations with Beijing; 3) China was one of Russia’s most important economic partners; 
4) within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, China was able to 
work with Russia to help achieve their common objectives in Central Asia; 5) Russia 
needed China as a partner in the project of reforming the international financial system.107 
Despite this, we should not forget the rise of China’s soft power, like Joseph Nye wrote 
in an article published in the «Wall Street Journal Asia» in November 2005. As a matter 
of fact, Beijing’s active participation in international peacekeeping operations under UN 
auspices and its increasingly cooperative stance in global institutions such as the World 
Trade Organisation, had the purpose to give an image of China as a good international 
citizen.108 
     As concerned the Russian stance, the Kremlin aimed at establishing closer ties with 
the Asian partner; hence, at the SCO Moscow summit of 2005 the question of energy trade 
surfaced. The joint communiqué, in fact, stated that it had become by then necessary to 
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embark on practical implementation of the Action Plan drafted at the meeting of February 
19, 2005 in Bishkek, on “pilot” projects in the field of energy, transport, 
telecommunications, science and technology. The meeting of heads of ministries in 
charge of foreign economic and trade activities was then in charge of reviewing the issue 
of the soonest establishment of ad hoc working groups on fuel and energy complex.109 To 
tell the truth, the formal idea to set up an energy club within the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation was formulated by President Putin at the Dushambe meeting of 2006, when 
he said: «I believe that creating a SCO energy club is a pressing issue […] Russia is 
considering financing some projects in the economic sphere […]».110 During the same 
meeting, President Hu appealed the two sides to implement a development programme 
for the 2006-2010 period as soon as possible, saying the two countries could further 
cooperate in the energy field.111 At the same time, China hoped to intensify cooperation 
with other members of the SCO in the oil sector. «Cooperation in the oil sector enjoys rosy 
prospects and will benefit all the SCO members», said Zhou Jiping, deputy general 
manager of China National Petroleum Corporation.112  
     Actually, Moscow and Beijing had very different understandings of energy security. 
For the former it meant security of demand, particularly for pipeline gas. In fact, oil and 
gas accounted for over sixty per cent of Russia’s exports in value terms and over half of 
federal budget revenues. China’s conception of energy security, on the other hand, was 
focused on the more conventional understanding of security of supply.113 According to 
Bobo Lo, China pursued a multi-continental approach to acquiring equity in energy 
ventures. Over the longer term, Beijing had no interest in Russia becoming a monopoly 
or strategic supplier of its energy needs. Instead, China was expected to view Russia as a 
“limited-use” partner, of far less importance than its main sources in the Persian Gulf and 
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Africa.114 On the other hand, Russia was repeatedly stating its interest in diversifying its 
energy exports away from an overreliance on European customers. Putin sought to 
promote a vision of Russia as a modern great Power and energy was to be the key to this 
transformation. Instead, rather like nuclear weapons during the Cold War, energy ended 
up being identified with aggressive power. China, on the other hand, played a pivotal role 
in facilitating Russia’s pursuit of an “independent” foreign policy by reinforcing 
Moscow’s self-confidence vis-à-vis the West, thus Chinese geopolitical insurance had 
become more valuable to Moscow than Russian energy was to Beijing.115  
     The official Chinese press pointed out in 2006 that effective cooperation between 
China and Russia in the fields of world security and crisis handling indicated that the 
Sino-Russian strategic partnership had become an important factor in ushering in a 
multinational framework of world politics and bringing equality into international 
relations, adding that the prospects of cooperation in the field of energy were expected to 
increase strategic interdependence.116 According to Chinese scholars, one of the most 
striking features of the improvement of Sino-Russian relations was the relatively weak 
position of Russia compared with the rising posture of China at the time of their 
rapprochement, stating that Moscow could not influence China the way the Soviet Union 
did. In short, most Chinese academics thought that Russia had accepted the reality of a 
“Rising China” in the global economy. With regard to the uniqueness of Russia’s strategic 
situation, Chinese scholars and policymakers saw three defining factors. Firstly, they 
believed that Russia’s geographical location created a conflicted identity for the Russian 
nation. Although more closely linked to Western civilisation, and considering themselves 
superior to the Asian one, Russians were thought to define their own uniqueness as being 
linked to their Eastern Orthodox Christian faith. Secondly, Russia was said to have a 
history of military imperialism, unlike China. Thirdly, Russia wanted what former 
Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov had called “Sovereign Democracy,” a special Russian 
model of democracy based on a multi-party managed system. China, on the other hand, 
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preferred a one-party system with popular participation. The self-image of the Chinese 
was one open to the world, pro-market and pro-diversity, whilst the Russians were viewed 
as being more insular and nationalistic in the economic and trade domains. Some Chinese 
scholars went as far as to say that Beijing and Moscow had a greater need for the West 
than they did for each other, thus reinforcing mutual misunderstanding and distrust.117  
     At the summit of 2006, President Putin suggested lunching an SCO energy club, or gas 
OPEC. In particular, the Kremlin was interested in taking part in multilateral cooperation 
within such a framework in order to diversify export channels and decrease political risks 
on global oil and gas markets. On that occasion, the ad hoc Working Group on Energy 
had been mandated to explore the possibility of establishing the SCO Energy Club.118 
Putin’s proposal provoked fears in the West that Russia might use its energy wealth for 
political purposes. In the same days, Stephen Blank wrote that if Moscow and Tehran 
successfully managed to form such a “club”, then they would be able to exercise the same 
power as the one that Saudi Arabia possessed in OPEC, also allowing Russia to provide 
Iran with help in developing its refining capacity.119 An interesting interpretation is the 
one given by Nargis Kassenova, who compares the prospects of the SCO Energy Club 
with other similar alliances promoted by Russia in the previous years. In January 2002, 
for example, Putin had proposed the formation of a Eurasian Gas Alliance with 
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, with the purpose to stabilise prices and help 
solve the issue of the division of Caspian reserves. As concerned the SCO Energy Club, 
Moscow hoped to make the organisation more attractive to other States like India, as well 
as remind Europe that Russian sources could reach other markets, thus counterbalancing 
NATO as an energy security guarantor. As a matter of fact, Putin proposed the Club only 
weeks after China had received its first shipment of pipeline oil from Kazakhstan. On the 
other hand, Chinese experts expressed doubts over the viability of such a project. In fact, 
Beijing and Moscow did not have the same priorities, as the former was an importer 
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interested in supplies and construction of facilities, while the latter was an exporter 
considering Central Asia as an appendix of its energy export policy. Though not officially 
rejecting Putin’s proposals, the Chinese felt more comfortable in dealing with bilateral 
relations.120 From the outlook of the Central Asian Republics, the framework of the SCO 
was seen as an important source for economic investment to aid their ailing domestic 
economies.121  
     
 4. American reactions  
 
 The Americans had a completely different attitude. An example of how negative the 
Russian point of view is, may be found in the pages by Yuri Morozov on «Far Eastern 
Affairs». The author, in fact, says that Washington, due to economic interests and the will 
to keep unilateralism, was working towards the disintegration of Eurasia by supporting 
radicalism, separatist movements, and inciting internal civil conflicts.122 Whether this was 
true or not, Professor S. Frederick Starr, chairman of the Central Asia and Caucasus 
Institute, published a 36-page paper titled A Greater Central Asia Partnership for 
Afghanistan and its Neighbors in March 2005. Actually, Starr was quoting the Silk Road 
Strategy Act accepted in the Congress in 1999, which outlined the policies of the US 
towards Central Asia and the Caucasus. The document advocated that the US foreign 
policy should be condensed to democracy building, liberal market policies, preservation 
of human rights and regional economic integration.123 In short, Starr claimed that there 
were not any effective region-wide structures promoting security and development across 
all of Greater Central Asia and explained the lack of other regional initiatives: a) Russia’s 
Commonwealth of Independent States was functionally dead; b) the Central Asian 
common market was stillborn; c) Japan’s “Six Plus One” programme took a region wide 
approach to development but not to security, and it excluded Afghanistan; d) the Shanghai 
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Cooperation Organisation combined security and economic concerns, but ignored 
political development; e) NATO was active in the five former Soviet States and in 
Afghanistan, but it had no strategy or overarching structure of engagement with the 
region.124 
     To tell the truth, it was no secret that US companies had a stake in the Eastern energy 
market. Bush and Putin had signed a joint declaration energy cooperation and accordingly 
the ministers had been instructed to continue their energy dialogue, concentrating 
on ways to enhance energy security, improve the transparency of the business 
and investment environment. 125  Curiously enough, the Russian Foreign Ministers 
delivered a speech whose attitude was not so conciliatory towards the United States. In 
fact, Lavrov stated that the world community was going through the complex stage of 
formation of a new system of international relations. The SCO could and should make its 
constructive contribution to the establishment of its basic principles, that is mutual respect 
and reliance upon international law and the Charter of the United Nations. The 
establishment of such approaches was particularly topical for Central Asia, towards 
whose stability the Russian Federation was profoundly interested.126 
     Starr’s ideas influenced the government somehow, as in October 2005 the State 
Department’s South Asia section was given responsibility for reviewing the policy 
towards five Central Asian countries. A few months later, in April 2006, the Assistant 
Secretary of State, Richard Boucher, spoke before the House of Representatives’ 
Committee on Foreign Affairs. In his report, he made it clear that Russia and China were 
not regarded as major players in the area. To advance regional economic development 
and integration, he said, Washington pursued a strategic dialogue with the countries of 
the region, including Afghanistan, helping build new links among the countries of the 
broader region and connect them more closely to the rest of the world. Likewise, the 
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promotion of freedom through democratic and economic reform was a key pillar of the 
American strategy, also in order for foreign investors to feel confident in the rule-of-law 
before committing to large and risky ventures. 127  Within the overall China-US 
relationship, the energy factor could play a significant role either in reducing or in 
enhancing mutual trust. Some Chinese scholars believed that strategic resources were of 
a zero-sum nature, and that competition for strategic resources between China and the US 
would inevitably lead to the outbreak of conflicts.128 On the other hand, energy could also 
be seen as a source of cooperation. On this question, Kenneth Lieberthal and Mikkal E. 
Herberg wrote in 2006 that the energy sector provided an arena in which US-China 
cooperation could be beneficial, both in signalling a relatively benign American posture 
towards China’s development and in providing for outcomes that were in the long term 
interests of the US. What was at stake, we can read in the report for the National Bureau 
of Asian Research titled China’s Search for Energy Security: Implications for U.S. 
Policy,  was the global governance of oil. Due to China’s growing scale of oil imports 
and its market impact, in fact, China was also developing its own strategic petroleum 
reserves. Since all importers were supposed to benefit from reduced prices in a crisis, 
there was likely to be growing resentment that China would be “free-riding” on 
emergency oil releases during a crisis.129  
     Nonetheless, Beijing sought to allay foreign apprehensions over its growing power by 
articulating the proposition of China’s “peaceful rise.” In a 2005 «Foreign Affairs» article 
by Zheng Bijian, a quasi-official policy statement was released, giving assurance that 
China had adopted a strategy to achieve a new international political and economic order 
through incremental reforms and the democratisation of international relations. Hence, 
the Asian Power had no intention to follow the path of Germany leading up to World War 
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I or those of Germany and Japan leading up to World War II.130 Washington’s response 
was to articulate the concept of China as a “responsible stakeholder” in the international 
system, shouldering additional responsibilities. In a 2005 speech at the National 
Committee on United States-China Relations, Robert Zoellick, then Deputy Secretary of 
State, responded to Zheng’s article by inviting China to become a privileged member, and 
shaper, of the international system. Simply put, the China of the early XXI century was 
not the Soviet Union of the late 1940s, as it did not seek to spread radical, anti-American 
ideologies. Moreover, while not yet democratic, Beijing did not see itself in a twilight 
conflict against democracy and capitalism around the globe. Most importantly, China did 
not believe that its future depended on overturning the fundamental order of the 
international system. As an outcome of that, China was invited to work with the United 
States to develop diverse sources of energy.131 Almost concurrently, Hu Jintao delivered 
a speech at the United Nations General Assembly reaffirming the importance of the UN 
system as a framework for international security and development and outlined what 
China stood for. While reiterating that the Dragon favoured the trend towards 
democratisation of world affairs, the President insisted that his country would pursue its 
goals peacefully and within the framework of the UN system.132 Hu’s speech recalled the 
Sino-Russian joint statement of XXI century world order delivered the previous Spring, 
on grounds of which the problems facing mankind could only be solved on the basis of 
universally recognised principles and norms of international law and in a fair and rational 
world order. Therefore, the international community should thoroughly renounce the 
mentality of confrontation and alignment, should not pursue the right to monopolise or 
dominate world affairs, and should not divide countries into a leading camp and a 
subordinate camp. Hence, the international community was requested to pay close 
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attention to the issue of eliminating the gap in the development levels of developing and 
developed countries.133 
     To tell the truth, in those days rather an alarming view of the SCO was surfacing in the 
United States, that is the one regarding the Organisation as a strategic challenger to 
Washington and NATO military presence in Central Asia. This concept gained currency 
in July 2005, when, at the SCO annual summit in Astana, a communiqué was issued, 
declaring that U.S. military bases in Central Asia had served their initial purpose to 
stabilise Afghanistan and should be placed on a timetable for withdrawal.134 Just a few 
days later, the government of Uzbekistan issued an eviction notice for US forces to be 
completely withdrawn from the Karshi-Khanabad facility by November 2005. Among 
academics, the SCO Astana statement and K2 eviction were held up as examples of “soft-
balancing” against the United States. Robert Pape defined soft-balancing as «[…] actions 
that do not directly challenge US military preponderance but that use non military tools 
to delay, frustrate and undermine aggressive unilateral US policies».135 On the contrary, 
Alexander Cooley states that the hostile SCO reaction to US military presence in 
Uzbekistan was the culmination of regional concern that the West was planning more 
“Coloured Revolutions” in Central Asia, intending to overthrow regimes under the guise 
of promoting democracy. The collapse of Askar Akayev’s regime in Kyrgyzstan’s “Tulip 
Revolution” in March 2005 had sent shock waves across the region and marked the first 
regime change in Central Asia since its independence. Russia was convinced that these 
regime changes were directed against Moscow and were intended to bring pro-Western 
governments to power; China was concerned that such democratising forces might spill 
over and destabilise its Western province of Xinjiang. Central Asian leaders believed they 
might also become targets.136  
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     From the point of view of the Americans, instead, before 2005 Congressional Research 
reports on Central Asia had just mentioned the SCO in few words. According to Zhao 
Weiming, there were several reasons for that: first of all, when the SCO was established, 
the United States’ national power was vigorous and the Bush Administration was quite 
confident of American predominance. Then, at that time the economic situation of Russia 
was at low tide. Moreover, at first the SCO was focused on internal questions. Finally, due 
to Sino-Russian rivalry, Washington thought that the two Powers would never work 
together against the US.137 After the SCO Astana summit, the mainstream view was that 
the United States should establish a positive dialogue with the SCO, in order to prevent 
the Organisation from becoming a tool in Russian and Chinese hands to dominate Central 
Asia, especially bearing in mind that US application to achieve observer status had been 
rejected, while that of Iran had been accepted.138 Therefore, July 2005 was a turning point 
for American strategists, as the SCO grew importance while it was being believed to pose 
a threat to US national interests. In particular, Russia and China were blamed of having 
played a key role in pushing Central Asian countries to close their military bases to 
American troops. At the same time, the Organisation had acquired the goal to provide an 
effective forum to coordinate common efforts to prevent Washington from interfering in 
their domestic affairs.139 Within such a scenario, the United States National Security 
Strategy of 2006 stated that it was necessary to work closely with Russia on strategic 
issues of common interest and to manage questions on which there were differing 
interests. The point was that Russia had great influence not only in Europe and its own 
immediate neighbourhood, but also in many other regions of vital interest to Washington. 
Hence, the Kremlin was supposed to be encouraged to respect the values of freedom and 
democracy at home and not to impede the cause of freedom and democracy in other areas. 
Unfortunately, we can read in the document, recent trends were pointing towards a 
diminishing commitment to democratic freedoms and institutions. Instead, as a 
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responsible stakeholder China was called to fulfilling its obligations and works with the 
United States and others. The Bush Administration encouraged Beijing to continue down 
the road of reform and openness towards liberty, stability, and prosperity. Despite this, 
Chinese leaders were being accused of continuing China’s military expansion in a non-
transparent way, and acting as if they could somehow “lock up” energy supplies around 
the world or seek to direct markets rather than opening them up.140  
     As it was easy to predict, such words about democracy and human rights were 
interpreted in a completely different way in the Eastern capitals. Just a month after the 
publication of the afore mentioned document, the President of the United States met his 
Chinese colleague, who promptly responded to reporters asking him when China would 
become a democracy with free elections: «I don’t know, what do you mean by 
democracy? What I can tell you is that we’ve always believed in China that if there is no 
democracy, there will be no modernisation, […] In the future, we will, in the light of 
China's own national conditions and the will of the Chinese people, continue to move 
ahead the political restructuring and to develop a socialist democracy».141 Engagement 
without considering rightful Chinese concerns and interests could be interpreted by the 
Chinese as a comprehensive containment strategy. Hence, on one hand the United States 
aimed at encouraging China towards participation in the open, global, market-based 
economic order; on the other hand, China’s concerns over political stability, national 
unity, and State sovereignty had to be recognised and respected.142 
 
Conclusions 
 
China’s soft power was emphasised by Joshua Kurlantzick, who spoke about the dangers 
for the United States of Beijing’s newfound diplomatic skills. He saw China vying with 
the United States for hegemony not just regionally, but globally: «China may become the 
                                                          
140  See The National Security Strategy of the United States of the America, March 2006, in 
http://media.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/2628/nss2006.pdf [accessed on June 6, 2019]. 
141 Remarks Following a Meeting with President Hu Jintao of China and an Exchange with Reporters, April 
20, 2006, in PPPUS, George W. Bush, 2006, Book I, pp. 754-758, in 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-2006-book1/html/PPP-2006-book1-doc-pg754.htm [accessed 
on June 6, 2019]. 
142 See Z. ZHU, US-China Relations in the 21st Century: Power Transition and Peace, London-New York, 
NY, Routledge, 2006, pp. 176-177. 
A New Balance of Power for the Twenty-First Century 
45 
first nation since the fall of the Soviet Union that could seriously challenge the United 
States for control of the international system».143 In late 2005, the American commentator 
Charles Krauthammer adopted a similar zero-sum perspective by viewing even the 
prospect of China’s diplomatic success in promoting North Korean denuclearisation as 
potentially bad for the United States. Beijing would gain in relative power terms vis-à-vis 
the United States, marking China’s emergence from an economic and demographic 
dynamo to a major actor on the world stage.144 To tell the truth, the Americans were not 
the only ones worried about the emergence of China. As an evidence of this, Putin gave 
an interview saying that the overall positive picture of trade and economic cooperation 
with China was not all perfect. Russian exports of machinery and equipment to China, for 
example, had almost halved in 2005, but at the same time there had been a steady rise 
of goods flowing from China to Russia.145 
     Actually, public opinion in the United States thought that also in Russia the situation 
of democracy and human rights was getting worse. Nonetheless, cooperation with the 
Kremlin was always regarded as a mutual interest on issues like counter-terrorism and 
counter-proliferation.146 To tell the truth, we realise how diplomatic Bush was when 
dealing with the question of democracy in Russia, when he said that he understood there 
would be a Russian-style, different from the line followed in the United States.147 On the 
question of democratic principles, a real watershed was the hearing of Assistant Secretary 
of State Richard Boucher before the Congress Commission on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe. In fact, what worried the Commission most was perhaps the implications of 
the SCO for democratisation and human rights in Central Asia, as the organisation had 
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vocally opposed the exportation of democracy. A further rise in SCO influence, according 
to the report, could only encourage the governments of Central Asia in more repressive 
and less reformist policies. Such a situation was contrary to United States interests, 
oriented to the transition of the Central Asian countries to democracy and market 
economies. Long-term stability was supposed to come from a process of democratic 
change, and Washington had to help the countries of the area develop their own 
democracies and economies. The Executive therefore believed that NATO played an 
important role in maintaining and strengthening relations, both among the Central Asian 
nations and between them and the outside world. In particular, China was said to pursue 
its interests in the region without asking any questions about democracy and human rights, 
accepting to deal with all sorts of regimes.148 Having said that, Stephen Blank underlined 
that the great game in Asia was not just about geostrategic or energy access, but also about 
political and ideological values, such as democratisation. Though the United States was 
not trying to overthrow governments in the area, the opposite was widely believed, thus 
allowing Beijing and Moscow ample scope to influence governments very concerned 
about their own internal and external security. From such a negative point of view, it was 
possible to see that there was an identity in Russo-Chinese approaches to world politics, 
which led them to try and drive the SCO in ways against American foreign policy 
objectives. At the same time, China viewed the American military and ideological 
presence in Central Asia as a source of strategic encirclement and had tried very hard to 
put pressure on both Kyrgyzstan and supported Uzbekistan in persuading them to push 
the Americans out. Furthermore, the minute US troops had been removed from the scene 
in Uzbekistan, Beijing had made inquiries as to whether or not it could move into Karshi-
Khanabad, and the Russians had promptly stopped it, thus showing that the Sino-Russian 
rivalry in Central Asia still existed. There were also differences between them as to where 
the SCO was going to go. Russia flirted with the idea of it being a military alliance, while 
                                                          
148 See Statement of Hon. Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, 
in The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Is it Undermining US Interests in Central Asia?: Hearing 
before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, One Hundred Ninth Congress, September 
26, 2006, Washington, D.C., US Government Printing Office, 2008, in 
https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/The%20Shanghai%20Cooperation%20Or
ganization%20Is%20it%20Undermining%20U.S.%20Interests%20in%20Central%20Asia.pdf [accessed 
on June 7, 2009]. 
A New Balance of Power for the Twenty-First Century 
47 
the Chinese had come out openly against such a project. In a few words, the SCO was seen 
as a work in progress and Blank said it was an organisation whose orientation was to a 
significant degree anti-American, but showing very little capability of developing into an 
anti-NATO or an anti-OSCE.149  
     If we analyse the other point of view, China’s National Defence of 2006 stated that the 
United States was accelerating military deployment to enhance its capability in the Asia-
Pacific region, strengthening the alliance with Japan in pursuit of operational integration. 
In particular, what Chinese authorities stressed was the fact that Japan’s military posture 
was becoming more external-oriented. Moreover, though the United States had reiterated 
that it would adhere to the “one China” policy, it continued to sell advanced weapons to 
Taiwan. 150  A few months previously, Hu Jintao had made a speech calling for a 
“harmonious society” among SCO members and proposing: a) long-term treaties of good 
neighbourhood, friendship and cooperation; b) stronger working level partnerships; c) 
human and cultural exchanges; d) openness and cooperation for the purpose of world 
peace.151 As concerned the Russians, on February 10, 2007, at the Munich Conference on 
Security Policy Vladimir Putin spoke about the importance of a multi-polar world. The 
President’s words expressed Russian disappointment at what the United States had been 
developed since the 1990s. In particular, he accused the White House of having 
practically set up a world «[...] in which there is one master, one sovereign. […] And this 
certainly has nothing in common with democracy. […] One state and, of course, first 
and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way». What 
the Russian President proposed, instead, was exactly the opposite, that is a multi-polar 
world, where a sort of balance of power could have acted as a mediator among different 
interests. What Putin showed anger and concern about was the question of NATO 
enlargement, which three years previously had included the Baltic States of Latvia, 
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Estonia and Lithuania, wondering why it was necessary to put military infrastructures 
on Russian borders.152 
     What the Bush Administration openly claimed was the right for the United States, as 
a global Power, to pursue normal relationships in Central Asia, particularly when dealing 
with energy supplies, or on issues of terrorism, or considering American interests in the 
democratic development of countries around the world.153 On an important question such 
as Sino-Russian relations within the SCO frame, instead, Stephen Aris reminded that 
Moscow was not so enthusiastic about Chinese interest in reducing trade barriers, with 
the ultimate goal to achieve a common market area. The Russian government, in fact, 
feared cheap Chinese goods would flood both Russian and Central Asian economies.154 
As concerned free market, President Bush viewed the growth of China as an opportunity 
to work with, as a growing middle class in China was fine for US exporters. Therefore, 
the Americans were working with Hu Jintao to convince him to help convert his economy 
from one of savers into one of consumers.155 Perhaps the most significant speech on the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was the one given by Deputy Assistant Secretary 
Evan A. Feigenbaum on September 6, 2007. Put it in a sharply way, what exactly was the 
relationship between two huge continental Powers, Russia and China, and the SCO smaller 
Central Asian members? And what was even more important: was the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation directed against the United States? These were the questions 
the Bush Administration was asking itself quite frequently. To be candid, the only certain 
thing was that the Americans put Central Asian matters at the centre of their own approach 
to that part of the world. Indeed, they also sought to work with Russia and China, with 
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the aim to have US interests, role and presence respected. Finally, the White House did 
not want Iranian participation in the SCO, even as an observer.156  
     Actually, by reading Hu Jintao’s speeches, we can easily figure out how the 
relationship between China and Russia was maybe closer than the Americans thought or 
hoped. As an evidence of this, Hu seemed to repeat what Putin had affirmed in Munich, 
when he said that the way towards a multi-polar world was irreversible and the 
international balance of power was changing in favour of the maintenance of world peace. 
At the same time, he specified, hegemonism and power politics still existed, posing 
difficulties and challenges to world peace and development. We can say that Chinese 
leaders had been coherent during the years, by keeping on quoting the same principle of 
democracy in international relations, which meant respect for national sovereignty, 
security, and any political system: «We respect the right of the people of all countries to 
independently choose their own development path. We will never interfere in the internal 
affairs of other countries or impose our own will on them […] China opposes all forms 
of hegemonism and power politics and will never seek hegemony or engage in 
expansion».157 As we can see, while on trade and financial matters it was not so difficult 
to find common ground, the question became much harder when dealing with principles 
and ideology. The geopolitical game taking place on the international chess board did not 
allow compromises on universal values such as democracy, equality among countries, 
and human rights. Obviously, no one could ignore a massive energy supplier like Russia, 
and above all a practically never ending market like the Chinese one. Differences emerged 
on economic issues as well, and this was object of interesting reflections by Henry 
Kissinger, with which we can conclude this work. China’s economic rise and growing 
US-China economic interdependence set up a sort of daily controversy, writes the former 
Secretary of State, with American frustrations and Chinese suspicions about American 
intentions. As concerned currency policies, in fact, in the American viewed the low value 
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of the Renminbi as currency manipulation favouring Chinese companies and contributing 
to the loss of American jobs. On the other hand, Beijing said that the pursuit of a currency 
policy favouring domestic manufacturers was rather an expression of China’s need for 
political stability.158 Kissinger’s opinion was that the United States treated economic 
issues from the point of view of the requirements of global growth, while China 
considered mainly the political implications, both domestic and international.159  The 
point was that China’s neighbours were being inevitably drawn into its orbit, while Asian 
countries suspicious of Chinese intentions saw Washington as a natural ally, thus 
augmenting tensions in the area. In such a context, the United States ended up appearing 
the loser, whose wealth and influence were being spent on the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and whose economic troubles had been eroded in a more dynamic Asia.160 
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